This is like affirming one who speaks without speech, wills without will, moves without movement, loves without love, prays without prayer, fasts without fasting, or performs Hajj without Hajj; or something white without whiteness, black without blackness, sweet without sweetness, bitter without bitterness, long without length, or short without shortness. The same applies to other derived expressions, such as the active participle, nouns of the fa‘ūl pattern, and adjectives formed by modifying either of these.

If this were not self-evidently false, both in reason and in revelation, we would have no way of distinguishing truth from falsehood. This is why those who deny the attributes ultimately revert to sophistry in rational matters and Qarmatianism in matters of revelation.

If, however, the question, “Does He know by virtue of His essence or by virtue of knowledge?” means that there is a bare essence existing without knowledge, and that knowledge is something additional to it, then this is a flawed conception. An essence stripped of the knowledge inseparable from it can only be conceived in the mind; it has no reality outside the mind.

The term “essence” may mean the essence characterized by knowledge. In that case, asking, “Does He know by virtue of His essence or by virtue of knowledge?” amounts to saying the same thing twice, since, on this interpretation, the term “essence” includes knowledge. Thus, “or by virtue of knowledge” does not constitute a separate alternative.

“Essence” may also mean the essence stripped of knowledge. But such an essence has no reality if it can only exist as knowing, just as that which can only be alive cannot exist