benefit him, for this is a dialectical argument, not one that establishes knowledge. Their concession does not oblige others to make the same concession. If sound reason establishes what accords with authentic transmitted evidence, this demonstrates the falsity of his position and theirs alike.

Likewise, his statement, “Now suppose that all these are expressed metaphorically. Where, then, is divine oneness, and where is the explicit indication of the pure divine oneness to which the essence of this upright religion calls—a religion whose majesty all philosophers acknowledge?” would be correct if what those who deny the divine attributes say were true. For then, according to their own position, true divine oneness would not have been explained at all. This conception of divine oneness is intended to secure the masses’ submission to them for the proper ordering of their worldly affairs.

We have discussed the conception of divine oneness held by Ibn Sīnā and others like him in several places, and have shown it to be among the most untenable doctrines, whose falsity is established by sound reason. We have also written a separate treatise on this subject elsewhere.