The second view is that He is an agent who acts by choice, but acts contingently, giving precedence to one of two equivalent alternatives without a determining factor—whether merely by virtue of His power, by virtue of His power and knowledge, or by virtue of His eternal will, which gives precedence to one equivalent alternative over another without a determining factor.

They say that events occur after not having occurred, without any cause necessitating their occurrence. They thus maintain that an effect can lag behind its fully sufficient cause.

Although this view is better than the preceding one—and for this reason various groups of speculative theologians have adopted it—its invalidity is also evident. For if it is said that the fully sufficient cause existed while its effect was delayed, and that, when the effect occurred, nothing arose to necessitate its occurrence, then the cause’s state before and after the effect’s occurrence would be exactly the same. Yet one of these two identical states would be distinguished by the presence of the effect, without any determining factor favoring it: an event would occur without a newly occurring cause. Sound reason plainly recognizes the invalidity of this.

The third view is that of the imams of the Sunnah: whatever Allah wills occurs, and whatever He does not will does not occur. Whatever Allah wills necessarily occurs through His will and power, while whatever He does not will is impossible