a principle of determination, such as a will, the question would still remain, for one could ask: “Why did it will this magnitude rather than another?” This is the same objection they pressed against the Muslims for ascribing things to the eternal will. We have already turned it back against them concerning the particular direction of the heavens’ motion and the determination of the two polar points.

Once it becomes clear that they must allow a cause to make one thing actual rather than another like it, allowing this without a cause is no different from allowing it with a cause. For there is no difference between directing the question at the thing itself—“Why does it have this particular magnitude?”—and directing it at the cause—“Why did it determine this magnitude rather than another like it?” If the question concerning the cause can be dismissed on the grounds that this magnitude is not like any other, since the order depends on it rather than on another, then the question concerning the thing itself can likewise be dismissed, and it would require no cause.

There is no escaping this. If this particular magnitude that actually obtains is like the one that does not, then the question remains: how was one thing distinguished from another like it? This is especially pressing on their own principles, since they deny a will that distinguishes between equivalents. But if it is not like it, then no