We have already quoted al-Āmidī’s discussion of the other arguments he mentioned for the impossibility of motion’s being eternal, including his statement:

“Why do you say that motion cannot be eternal? What they presented as the first argument would follow only if a single, particular motion were said to be eternal. But that is not what is meant. Rather, motion’s being eternal means that its successive individual instances have no beginning. In that case, there is no incompatibility between each individual motion’s being temporally originated and preceded by something else, and the totality of those individual motions’ being eternal, in the sense that they succeed one another without limit.”

He continues his discussion. The point here is to draw attention to the fact that, elsewhere, he undermined most of the arguments he used here.

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Another point that should be understood in this connection is that those who deny Allah’s being above His creation, and who argue for this denial—or for it and other claims—by denying corporeality, undermine the very arguments they use. Sometimes one of them undermines the arguments he uses …

as we have related concerning al-Rāzī and al-Āmidī