be in motion or at rest. Both alternatives are invalid, so the claim that they are eternal is invalid.

He then raised several objections to this, saying:

“One might argue: either motion means occupying a region after having occupied another region, and rest means occupying a region after having already been in that same region, or this is not the case. If the former, the exhaustive division is invalidated by a body at the first instant of its coming into existence, for it is not in motion, since it does not occupy a region after having previously been in it. If the latter, then his argument establishing that rest is something positively existent is invalid. There is no escaping this objection.”

I say:

This is a disputed question among those engaged in rational inquiry: when a body comes into existence, is it described as being in one of these two states, or is it in neither? What al-Rāzī stated is the view of