for the spatial region corresponding to this magnitude to admit existence while the adjacent region does not, since purely abstract spatial regions are even more alike than magnitudes.

If you claim such particularization in this case, it is all the more appropriate and fitting in the case of what is necessary in itself. Furthermore, even supposing that magnitudes and attributes are temporally originated, the weakness of the argument based on denying an infinity of originated events has already been established. He himself has invalidated all the arguments he cited from others except one that he selected, which is weaker than the rest, as has been mentioned more than once.

If this argument does not rule out the possibility of originated events occurring successively in the eternal being, then it does not preclude the eternal being from being a locus of originated events. Their use of such an argument to deny this is therefore invalid.

He himself has thus challenged these three arguments. As for the fourth, concerning the multiplicity of attributes, challenging it follows from challenging these three, since it rests upon them. These three are the mainstay of those who deny the attributes, and their entire discussion revolves around them: the argument from composition; the argument from accidents, namely that whatever is never free of something temporally originated is itself temporally originated; and the argument from particularization.

His initial arguments for denying that the Necessary Being is a substance rest upon denying the similarity of substances. Yet he has explained that everything they have mentioned amounts to what he himself said, and he stated that it contains no evidence for denying their similarity.