it is not possible, then it is established that some magnitudes, unlike others, are intrinsically impossible for possible beings; this applies all the more to what is necessary.

Thus, the claim that “For every magnitude, something larger and something smaller is possible” is invalidated. If a magnitude other than this one is possible, then singling out one of the two possibilities for existence requires a determiner.

Absolute existence has no particularity that singles out one possibility rather than another. The determiner must therefore be something possessing a particularity, and that particularity is necessary in itself. If what is necessary in itself possesses a necessary particularity, one cannot say, “Every particularity must have a determiner,” since particularity may be either necessary in itself or possible.

To clarify this: suppose a philosophizer says that what necessitates the celestial sphere’s having one magnitude rather than another is, for example, that matter can receive only that magnitude, that extension beyond the world is impossible, or some other reason that has been proposed.

He is asked: Although what you have said about matter and the impossibility of anything existing beyond the world is false, what necessitates matter’s having no characteristic other than that one? Why could matter not have been different from this, such that it could receive a shape larger than this one? Then, if you claim that a possible being has a magnitude beyond which it cannot be larger because there is no substrate capable of receiving it, even though no determiner is known that singles out one magnitude rather than another, nor