and if this is said, it follows that some magnitude must be necessary, with no other magnitude possible. If this is said of what is possible, it applies all the more to what is necessary in itself, since alternative possibilities are more readily admissible for what is possible in itself than for what is necessary in itself. Thus, if a magnitude beyond which nothing larger can exist is posited for what is possible, it is all the more appropriate to posit this for what is necessary in itself.

The crux of the answer is that, if that which necessitates its effect—which they call a cause—has a magnitude, the very foundation of their position is invalidated. If it has no magnitude, then either all magnitudes are possible in relation to it or they are not. In the former case, it would not single out some rather than others without a determiner, since that would entail preferring one of two equivalent things over the other without any reason for preference. If only some magnitudes are possible, as certain philosophizers maintain, it follows that some magnitudes are impossible in themselves ن; indeed, some must be uniquely determined, with no other magnitude capable of existing.

If some magnitudes can be impossible in themselves, then it is all the more appropriate and fitting that some should be necessary in themselves. And if one possible magnitude can be uniquely determined in itself to the exclusion of others, then it is all the more appropriate and fitting that a magnitude necessary in itself should be uniquely determined.

This is an argument they cannot escape. If the world is necessary in itself, it is thereby established that what is necessary in itself has a particular magnitude. If it is possible, then the existence of something larger or smaller than it is either possible in itself or not.

If