Thus, whoever holds that He may become devoid of the sounds, acts, and the like with which He is characterized is not being inconsistent.

Those among them who maintain that He cannot become devoid of what He is characterized by chiefly argue that, if this were possible, it could occur only through the arising of a contrary. That newly arisen contrary could then cease only through another newly arisen contrary, entailing an infinite succession of events within His essence. Some of them answer that it may cease without a contrary arising; others answer by accepting an infinite succession of this kind in the future.

[Return to al-Āmidī’s discussion refuting the Karrāmiyyah: Seventh]

Discussing the inconsistency of the Karrāmiyyah, al-Āmidī said that they allowed a newly arisen will to coexist with the eternal will, but disallowed this in the case of knowledge and power. If asked to explain the distinction, they would be unable to do so.

[Ibn Taymiyyah’s comment]

I say: One may respond that, although they drew this distinction, others did not, but allowed new instances of knowledge and power to arise.

In that case, their distinction rests on the same basis upon which the Muʿtazilah relied in distinguishing between His having knowledge and power and His having speech and will