the reply is:
“Granted that this is so. Yet if the other thing is a necessary consequence of the component that is necessary in itself, then the whole is a necessary consequence of that component itself.”

In short, among the things taken together, there is something that necessarily entails all the others.

If it is said, “Then only that which entails the others is necessary in itself,” the reply is:
“This is a verbal dispute. Possible things must have an agent—from the agent—and the proof establishes this. Nothing you have mentioned rules out His essence necessarily entailing things inseparable from Him, or His name encompassing both what entails and what is entailed, even if the former is called necessary in itself and the latter necessary through another, as some have said concerning the essence and the attributes.”

His opponent may therefore say: “These, then, are all the arguments that he and others have presented to deny that what is necessary in itself is a body or a substance. It has become clear that none of them establishes this; indeed, they support the opposite of their intended conclusion more strongly than they support that conclusion.”

We have discussed this because of the reference he made when he said: “If each letter subsists in a subject different from that of the other, composition necessarily follows, and we have disproved this in our refutation of corporealism.”

He then presented the second argument, saying: “There is no greater reason for certain parts, rather than others, to be assigned certain letters than for the reverse.”