The fourth line of argument:

One may ask: Why could some of those parts not be necessary and others possible?

As for his statement, “What depends on the possible has all the more reason to be possible,” the reply is: When would this hold, if the possible part is a necessary implication of the necessary part, or vice versa?

Likewise, of the totality of existence, some is necessary in itself and some is possible. The possible within it consists of effects produced by what is necessary in itself. Yet it does not follow that the totality of existing things has all the more reason to be possible than those existing things that are possible.

Those who offer this answer employ it in several contexts, one of which concerns the essence together with its attributes. If someone says to such a person, “The essence and attributes constitute a whole composed of parts: either all of them are necessary, or some are necessary and others possible,” he may reply: “The essence is necessary, while the attributes are possible in themselves and necessary through the essence.” A group of people gives an answer of this kind.