the things that exist externally is composed of the very ground of commonality and the ground of distinction. Rather, each is distinguished by an attribute that resembles another. Yet it possesses attributes, some more general than others: that is, some have counterparts in a greater number of other things than others do. It is not itself, however, found in anything else.

As for the second reply:

There is no doubt that each of the two possesses necessity and another meaning besides necessity. Indeed, even a single necessary existent possesses necessity and its own essence. This is the counterexample with which al-Āmidī challenged them.

However, the statement:

“The necessity of existence would then be possible, since it depends on something else for its realization; what is characterized by it would have all the more reason to be possible,”

is ambiguous.

One may ask:

“What do you mean by necessity depending on something else? Do you mean that it depends on a causal agent, or that it necessarily entails something else?”

If you mean the former, that is false. Necessity, whether assumed to be particular or shared, does not require an agent. It does, however, require a subject characterized by it.

For necessity can belong only to a necessary existent. Its dependence on the subject characterized by it does not prevent that subject from being necessary; rather, it entails that the subject is necessary.

As for the statement, “Necessity is possible,” if what is meant is its dependence on