If it is said:

“The necessary existent and the possible existent share existence, but each differs from the other in its reality or quiddity.”

They are answered:

The meaning of existence applies to both, as does the meaning of reality. Each is distinguished from the other by its own particular existence, just as it is distinguished by its own particular reality. There is therefore no more reason to regard one as shared and the other as particular than to reverse the arrangement.

Likewise, if two necessary existents are posited, each having a reality, they share necessity in general and reality in general, while each is distinguished from the other by the necessity and reality peculiar to it.

Thus, the features by which you say they differ necessarily accompany one another, as do the features by which you say they have something in common. What you designate as the ground of commonality does not depend on what you designate as the ground of distinction, nor does the latter depend on the former. Rather, each is characterized by that through which it is distinct, namely what is peculiar to it.

These particular characteristics resemble those of the other in certain respects. That common element, which is not peculiar to either, is what they have in common.

If it is said, “This is a color, and this is a color,” the quality of being a color is particular to each, while that quality, considered generally, is shared by both.

Likewise, if it is said, “This is an animal, and this is an animal,” “This is a human being, and this is a human being,” “This is black, and this is black,” and other such examples, then none of