they have something in common and that by which they differ. For that by which they have something in common does not exist in external reality, while that by which they differ is not shared. Thus, neither contains both that by which they have something in common and that by which they differ. Rather, each possesses an attribute in respect of which it resembles the other, namely necessity. A subject’s possessing an attribute through which it resembles another in one respect, together with something peculiar to itself, merely entails that meanings subsist in it and that its essence necessarily entails those meanings. This does not conflict with necessary existence; indeed, necessary existence cannot be fully realized without it. Even if we concede that this constitutes composition, we do not concede that such composition is impossible, as explained earlier.

The first argument has thus been shown invalid on two grounds, and the second likewise on two grounds, apart from those they mentioned. And Allah knows best.

The first of these two arguments is the one Ibn Sīnā relied upon in his al-Ishārāt. We have discussed it at length in a separate treatise, explaining the foundations of this argument through which confusion arose for them in their logic and metaphysics, and likewise for their followers, such as al-Rāzī, al-Suhrawardī, al-Tūsī, and others.

There we set out two responses to it:

The first:

These thinkers took attributes that coincide in their universality and particularity and, by sheer arbitrary stipulation, posited some as particular and others as universal—for example, existence and being, reality and quiddity, and the like.