the absolute exists in external entities without a particularizing factor.” If, however, what is meant is the shared aspect that inheres in each of them—that is, what exists of the universal in external entities—then this is not shared among external entities, for whatever either possesses is peculiar to it and is not shared.

Accordingly, the necessity that actually exists is, in itself, peculiar to one of them and requires no particularizing factor. Thus, the necessity belonging to each of them in external reality does not depend on a particularizing factor. Once this is established, their argument for its being contingent is invalid.

As for the shared, absolute universal of necessity, it exists in neither of them and is not realized in external entities. Hence, it does not follow that the universal is realized in external entities without a particularizing factor.

It may also be said:

Suppose that what is shared is realized in external entities only through what is particular. This does not preclude its necessary existence, since a necessary existent is that which has no efficient cause—not that which neither entails anything nor is entailed by anything.

Al-Āmidī himself mentioned this earlier and explained that necessary existence may depend on a recipient; what is precluded is its dependence on an efficient cause.

This also refutes the second argument: namely, that necessary existence is composed of that by which