Darʾ Taʿâroud al-ʿAql wa-n-Naql - Ibn Taimiya - (4/256)

Darʾ Taʿâroud al-ʿAql wa-n-NaqlIbn Taimiya

Accordingly, regarding his statement, “What they have in common is other than what distinguishes them,” we reply:

They share nothing in external reality that would make their sharing it require something to distinguish them. Rather, they are distinct in themselves; they merely resemble one another or are alike in some respect. Two like things do not, by virtue of their similarity, require something to distinguish their individual entities. Each is distinct from the other in itself.

Regarding his statement, “What they have in common is either necessity of existence or something else,” we reply:

Each possesses its own particular necessity of existence, just as it possesses all the other attributes peculiar to itself. It also resembles the other in necessity of existence. The universal they share cannot be peculiar to either, while what is peculiar to each, as distinct from the other, cannot be shared. Still less can what they share require a particularizing factor, or something shared approximate, in that respect, what is peculiar to each.

Thus, what they have in common is the shared necessity of existence, while each is distinguished by its own particular necessity of existence. Likewise, they have in common whatever is shared, and each is distinguished by whatever is peculiar to it.

Regarding his statement:

“If what they have in common is necessity of existence, this is impossible for two reasons. The first is that what is shared must either be fully realized without that by which they differ—and this is impossible, since otherwise the absolute would be realized in external entities without a particularizing factor—or be fully realized only through that by which they differ. In the latter case, necessity of existence would be contingent, since its realization would depend on something other than itself.”

We reply:

If by what they share one means the absolute, universal meaning, then it does not require that by which they are distinguished. Nor does it exist in external entities such that one could say: “It would follow that

وحينئذ فقوله: ما به الاشتراك غير ما به الامتياز. قلنا: لم يشتركا في شيء خارجي حتى يحوجا أشتراكهما فيه إلى الامتياز، بل هما ممتازان بأنفسهما، وإنما تشابها. أو تماثلا في شيء والمتماثلان لا يحوجهما التماثل إلى مميز بين عينيهما، بل كل منهما ممتاز عن الأخر بنفسه. وقوله: ما به الاشتراك: إما وجوب الوجود أو غيره. قلنا: كل منهما مختص بوجوب وجوده الذي يخصه، كما هو مختص بسائر صفاته التي تخص نفسه، وهو أيضاً مشابه الآخر في وجوب الوجود، فما اشتركا فيه من الكلي لا يقبل الاختصاص، وما اختص به كل منهما عن الآخر لا يقبل الاشتراك، فضلا عن أن يكون ما اشتركا فيه محتاجاً إلى مخصص، وما اختص به كل منهما يقاربه فيه مشترك. وحينئذ فالاشتراك في وجوب الوجود المشترك والامتياز بوجوب الوجود المختص، والاشتراك أيضاً في كل مشترك، والامتياز بكل مختص. وقوله: إن كان الاشتراك بوجوب الوجود فهو ممتنع لوجهين: الوجه الأول: أن المشترك غما أن يتم بدون ما به الافتراق، وذلك محال، وإلا كان المطلق متحققاً في الأعيان من غير مخصص وإن لم يتم إلا بما به الافتراق كان وجوب الوجود ممكناً لافتقاره في تحققه إلى غيره. قلنا: أن أريد بالمشترك بينهما المعنى المطلق الكلي فذاك لا يفتقر إلى ما به الامتياز، وليس له ثبوت في الأعيان حتى يقال: إنه يلزم أن يكون