And existence as such, which is shared and universal, is not universal in either one; rather, it is universal in the mind and particular in external reality.

When it is said, “The natural universal exists,” this means that what is universal in the mind exists in external reality. Yet once it exists there, it cannot be universal—just as one says that what is general exists in external reality, although it does not exist there as general.

As for his statement, “Either they differ in every respect or they are alike in every respect,” we reply: if by difference one means the opposite of resemblance, it may be said that they do not differ in every respect. If, however, one means distinctness, then they differ in every respect.

His statement, “If they are alike in every respect, distinctness disappears,” is valid if by “difference” one means the opposite of distinctness: if neither is distinguished from the other in any respect, distinctness is indeed negated.

But if being alike means resemblance and similarity, they may be alike in every respect, as the parts of a single body of water are alike. Similarity does not entail that one of two like things is the other; rather, it must be other than it.