neither contains anything that is in the other. If by his statement, “or differ in every respect,” he means that they neither resemble one another nor share anything whatsoever, then there are no two things in existence that do not share something and resemble one another in some respect, even if only in what is denoted by “existence.” If, however, he means that one is distinct from the other, then each is distinct from the other in every respect, even though they share certain features in the sense of resembling one another—not in the sense of sharing one and the same thing in external reality, as co-owners share a property.

Once the ambiguity of these expressions is understood, we say: they resemble one another and share necessity of existence, just as any two things designated by a univocal term in the broad sense share what that term denotes. This holds whether the term applies equally—univocity in the strict sense—or applies in varying degrees, which contrasts with strict univocity. Thus, two existent things, two animals, two human beings, or two instances of blackness share what is denoted by the term encompassing them, although each is distinct from the other in external reality in every respect. They do not share anything peculiar to either one: the existence of this one is peculiar to it, and the existence of the other is peculiar to that other. They share only existence as such.