al-Ghazālī—is stronger than al-Āmidī’s. Anyone who answers this objection by saying that “necessary” is an equivocal term must, all the more, concede the invalidity of the philosophers’ account of divine oneness. For there would then be no objection to affirming multiple entities, each called “necessarily existent” in a different sense from the others.

In any event, either composition necessarily follows, or their account of divine oneness is invalid. Whichever follows, the other follows as well: if composition necessarily follows, their account of divine oneness is invalid; and if their account of divine oneness is invalid, multiple necessary beings become possible, which invalidates the claim that composition is impossible.

There is no doubt that their fundamental argument—indeed, that of those who deny Allah’s being above His creation and His attributes—is based on ruling out composition and affirming an uncompounded, absolute universal, like other universals. What they affirm exists only in the mind, whereas what they rule out is inseparable from every concrete entity. Thus they affirm what cannot exist in external reality and deny what must exist in external reality.

We shall demonstrate the invalidity of this by means other than those these thinkers have mentioned. We say: consider the assertion, “Either they agree in every respect, differ in every respect, or agree in some respects but not others.” If by this he means that they share one and the same thing existing in external reality, yet resemble one another in some respects, while what inheres in each is peculiar to that individual—as with two instances of whiteness or two similar white objects—even though