[Continuation of al-Āmidī’s discussion]
He said:

“On this basis, the second argument is invalidated. For if necessity amounts to a negative attribute, this does not entail that the essence of the necessarily existent being is composite. Otherwise, nothing simple would exist at all, since every simple entity is characterized by the negation of anything other than itself. Even if we concede that necessity of existence is a positive reality, the composition you claim must follow would still follow even if there were only one necessarily existent being. For what is designated as a necessarily existent being is composed of the essence characterized by necessity and intrinsic necessity itself. Whatever answer resolves this difficulty when there is only one such being also resolves it when there is more than one.”

[Ibn Taymiyya’s comment]
I say:

The first argument had already been advanced by al-Rāzī to refute this. Al-Rāzī also advanced the second argument, as al-Shahrastānī had before him: this is refuted by the necessarily existent being’s sharing with all other existent things the designation of existence, while being distinguished from them by necessity of existence. Thus, on your own principles, it comprises both that which it shares with others and that which distinguishes it from them.