of them necessarily existent in itself, there are only three possibilities: they agree in every respect, differ in every respect, or agree in some respects but not others. If the first is the case, there can be no multiplicity in what is designated as necessarily existent, since multiplicity and distinction without a distinguishing feature are impossible. If the second is the case, they do not share necessity of existence. If the third is the case, that which they share is distinct from that which differentiates them. If what they share is not necessity of existence, then they are not both necessarily existent; rather, only one of them is.

If, however, what they share is necessity of existence, this is impossible for two reasons.

The first reason is that the necessity of existence they share is either fully realized in each of the two necessarily existent beings without that which differentiates them, or it cannot be fully realized without it. The former is impossible, since otherwise the shared, unqualified meaning would be realized in concrete entities without anything to particularize it, which is impossible. In the latter case, necessity of existence would be contingent, because its realization depends upon something else. Thus, that which possesses this attribute—namely, what was said to be necessarily existent—would all the more have to be contingent.

The second reason is that, if what is designated as necessarily existent is composed of two elements—the necessity of existence they share and that which differentiates them—then its existence would depend upon each of its two constituents, and each