As for whether necessary existence has a subject characterized by it, that is a separate question. Yet he supported his claim by arguing that necessitation by virtue of one’s essence does not preclude the necessitating agent from having a receptive subject; likewise, existing necessarily in oneself does not preclude having a receptive subject. He cited the Active Intellect as evidence. However, they say that the Active Intellect does not necessitate by virtue of its essence, whereas the Lord, who necessitates by virtue of His essence, has no receptive subject.

It thus becomes clear that citing this as evidence is invalid and that the analogy does not fit.

The point here is that the argument upon which he and others like him rely to deny what they call composition is one they themselves have refuted elsewhere, yet invoked in another place. Indeed, it is weaker where they invoke it than where they refute it.

The same applies to the second argument he gives to refute composition. He says:

[Al-Āmidī’s discussion of refuting composition]

“The second argument for the impossibility of His being composed of parts is that those parts must either exist necessarily in themselves, or be contingent, or some must exist necessarily while others are contingent. The first alternative is inadmissible, as will be established in proving His oneness. If either the second or the third alternative holds, it is evident that whatever depends on something contingent—which itself depends on another—is all the more contingent and dependent. Whatever is contingent and dependent cannot exist necessarily in itself, and whatever does not exist necessarily in itself cannot be a deity.”