must regard quiddity as receptive to existence, and existence as an attribute of it. He thus makes necessary existence an attribute of something else, while an attribute depends upon its subject. Such dependence points more strongly to the attribute’s being contingent than does necessary existence’s dependence upon its inseparable attribute or upon what is posited as a part of it that exists only within itself. An attribute’s dependence upon that which possesses it is a stronger indication that the attribute is contingent in itself. If, then, necessary existence can be an attribute of a quiddity, how can its being a composite whole be impossible?

The most that can be said is that combination is an attribute of the combined parts, which exist necessarily. Yet it is evident that an attribute of parts that are necessary in themselves has a stronger claim to necessary existence than an attribute of a quiddity that is not itself existence.

Thus, what he mentioned there is an argument against him here, although it can be formulated more effectively than he formulated it. For one might say: “This is a weak formulation.”

This is because he said: “We do not concede that what is necessary in itself cannot depend upon something else. For what is necessary in itself is that which does not depend upon an efficient cause. It is not impossible for it to be a necessitating cause by virtue of itself, even if it depends upon a receptive subject, for