It is well known that a thing’s dependence on one of its parts is not like its dependence on something that is not part of it. The former does not negate its complete necessity, since its dependence on a part of itself is no greater than its dependence on itself. That which is necessary in itself cannot dispense with itself, and therefore cannot dispense with anything included within what constitutes itself. But if necessary existence and a quiddity distinct from it are posited, then that which is necessary depends on something not included within what its own name denotes. How, then, can someone who allows that rule out this?

For this reason, the position of those who affirm the divine attributes is better than that of Abū Hāshim and others like him among the Muʿtazilah and their followers, who held that the existence of every entity in external reality is distinct from its essence in external reality, and that the existence of the Necessary Existent is additional to His quiddity. Nevertheless, some of those who affirm the attributes agreed with him on this in the course of their discussions—even some followers of the four imams, Ahmad and the others, such as Ibn al-Zāghūnī. This is also one of al-Rāzī’s two positions; indeed, it is the one he preferred in most of his books. Abū Hāmid likewise held this position.

There is therefore greater reason to reject this kind of composition than the other; at the very least, the grounds for rejecting it are equally strong. For whoever says that existence is additional to quiddity