itself, which is impossible. If the agent were something other than the essence, its necessary existence would be derived from something other than itself, and so its existence would not be necessary in itself.”

He then said: “This argument is weak, since one might say: ‘There is nothing to prevent existence additional to the essence from being necessary in itself. As for your claim that it depends on the essence, and that whatever depends on something else cannot be necessary in itself, we reply: We do not concede that what is necessary in itself cannot depend on something else. Rather, what is necessary in itself is that which does not depend on an efficient cause. Nor is it impossible for it to be intrinsically necessitating, even though it depends on a recipient. For an agent that necessitates by its very essence may depend on a recipient for its causal operation, whether its intrinsic necessitation concerns itself or something external to it. This is like what the philosopher says concerning