and stated that he was unable to answer it. What it amounts to is the necessary existence of things that are contingent in themselves, none of which is an existent necessary in itself; rather, each is caused by another, and the aggregate is caused by its parts.

It is well known that, if we suppose an aggregate to be necessary by virtue of its necessary parts, which cannot cease to exist, this is more rationally tenable than an aggregate made necessary by parts each of which is contingent and does not exist independently. For whatever depends on contingent things has a stronger claim to being contingent, whereas that whose existence necessarily follows from necessary things cannot cease to exist.

Sound reason, which has never proved false, knows that a composite made up of parts each of which is contingent and has no independent existence is likewise contingent and has no independent existence. As for a composite whose parts are each necessary in themselves, there is nothing to preclude its being necessary in itself—that is, by virtue of those parts, which include what is necessary.

If it is said that the combination itself depends on the parts, each of which is necessary in itself, then the dispute is merely verbal.

The point is that reason accepts this as possible, but does not accept the possibility of parts each being contingent n while the aggregate is necessary by virtue of them. These people have inverted rational truths