and the subject of intellection, the object of intellection, and intellect itself; delightful and an object of delight ن; loving His own essence and loved by it—and other such diverse meanings.

If it is said, “All these are one thing,”

the reply is: This is self-evidently false, since it implies that knowledge is love, and that the knowing, loving subject is knowledge and love. Even if its possibility were conceded, the claim that a body is not composed of matter and form, nor of indivisible atoms, but is instead a single, simple entity, would be more reasonable than claiming that these realities are identical.

If the objector belongs to the Muʿtazilah or similar groups, they concede that His essence entails His being living, knowing, and powerful. If he belongs to those who affirm the attributes, they concede that His essence entails knowledge, power, life, and other attributes. Thus, every group is compelled to acknowledge that His essence entails inseparable concomitants. No one, therefore, has any way of denying this mutual entailment, whether or not it is called dependence, and whether or not it is said to imply composition.

[Fourth]

One may ask concerning the statement that a composite depends upon each