Their fundamental principle is that one of two equivalent possibilities may be selected rather than the other without a determining agent, but solely by will ن, and that the essence entails that particular will in that particular manner rather than any other, not because of anything else.

Thus, if it is said that the essence entails finitude in one direction but not another, or a particular magnitude, this would be no less consistent with plain reason than denying it, especially since, moreover, they say: this would be no less consistent with plain reason than denying it, especially since, moreover, they say that this will entails that events should be finite at one end but not the other. According to them, events have no limit in the direction of the future, although they are finite in the direction of the past, and although they could have occurred earlier or later than the point at which they began to occur. Yet it is will that selects one of two equivalent possibilities, and the essence that determines that particular will rather than any other will. It likewise determines the particular speech that commands a particular thing, rather than other speech and commands.

The Muʿtazilīs say that this essence selects one of two things within His power rather than other equivalent things within His power. Likewise, it determines its being commanding, speaking, and acting through a particular command, particular speech, and a particular act, rather than other commands, speech, and acts. It also determines the will, or His being willing, rather than another will or another state of willing.

The philosophers say that the essence or existence, which is not distinguished by