capable of being pointed to,” and that the assertion that there exists a being who is neither inside the world nor outside it, neither indwelling it nor separate from it, who cannot be pointed to, who neither draws near to anything nor moves away from anything, to whom nothing ascends and from whom nothing descends, and other such negative attributes, is impossible according to reason.

They said: “What necessitates that division and rules out the existence of such a being is imagination, not reason. Imagination applies judgments concerning sensible things to what is not sensible, and this is invalid.”

They were told: “You have not yet established the existence of anything that cannot be perceived by the senses. The judgment of innate disposition is primary and self-evident. Moreover, according to you, imagination perceives only particular things, such as enmity and friendship—for example, a sheep’s perception of the wolf’s enmity and the ram’s friendship. These, however, are universal judgments, and universals fall within the province of reason, not imagination.”

This and similar arguments refute their defense that this is a judgment of imagination. The point here, however, is that if this defense is valid, their opponents may invoke it here, saying: “Your claim that, if He were above the Throne, or if He were a body, He would have extension and would be either finite or infinite, is a judgment of imagination. It presupposes that extension may be affirmed or denied of Him, or that finitude may be affirmed or denied of Him. We say that He is above the Throne, or that He is above the Throne, yet He cannot be extended, nor can He be non-