If their opponent were to say to them, “Two self-subsisting existents must have a boundary and separation between them. We thus know that this existent is finite on this side. As for the other side, we cannot know that infinite extension there is impossible unless we know that infinitely extended dimensions cannot exist. This, however, is not known to us, or is false,” his statement would be stronger than theirs.

The point here is that the furthest they can go in refuting these people’s position is to rule out infinite extension, invoke the absence of any priority, or assert that mingling is necessary.

Their opponents can challenge these premises far more forcefully than they themselves can challenge the premises of their opponents’ argument. They also face stronger objections of inconsistency and stronger counterarguments than those faced by their opponents. This is discussed at length in its proper place.

This argument, and similar arguments advanced by the negationists, can therefore be refuted in many ways. Some involve countering them with the positions of others who hold false beliefs and showing that those positions are no more false than the negationists’ own position. If one of the two positions can be rejected only on the basis of the same premise used to reject the other, then rejecting one has no greater claim than rejecting the other. Rather, if the premise is sound, both must be rejected; if it is false, it provides no grounds for rejecting either. How, then, if