bodies among the Mu‘tazilī and Ash‘arī theologians, he said:

“They based this on their principle that a body is a composite substance or a substance constituted by combination; that substances are homogeneous; and that composition, considered simply as composition, does not differ. Thus, the bodies resulting from them do not differ.”

It is well known that these two principles, on which they based the claim that bodies are identical in nature, have been refuted by him and by others. Most rational people disagree with them on these matters. Most do not hold that bodies are composed of indivisible atoms: neither the majority of the adherents of religious traditions nor the majority of philosophers. Indeed, most theologians—including the Hishāmiyyah, Najjāriyyah, Dirāriyyah, Kullābiyyah, and Karrāmiyyah—do not hold this view. What, then, of the various scholars outside the ranks of the theologians? They are among its strongest opponents.

Likewise, the assertion that substances are identical in nature has no supporting proof. Among those who debate indivisible atoms, some maintain that they differ in nature, while others maintain that they are identical.

Furthermore, concerning the statement, “His particular magnitude must be determined either by His own essence or by something external,” one may ask its proponent: “By ‘His own essence,’ do you mean merely the corporeality shared by bodies, or His own essence, which is unique to Him and distinguishes Him from others?”

As for the first, no rational person would maintain it, for no rational person accounts for a distinctive property by a factor