every body.

It thus becomes clear that everything he has said is fallacious, for he said:

“Either it is said that He is a body like other bodies, or it is said that He is a body unlike other bodies. If the latter is maintained, the dispute concerns wording, not meaning.”

This shows that his position agrees in meaning with that of someone who says, “A body unlike other bodies.” He then made the first alternative the view that bodies are alike. Thus, his statement really amounts to this: either it is said that He resembles bodies in their reality, such that what is necessary, possible, or impossible for them is likewise necessary, possible, or impossible for Him, or this is not said. Whoever does not say this does not dispute with him over the meaning, while whoever adopts the first position holds a false view.

It is well known that none of the recognized groups or those whose views have been transmitted has said that He is a body resembling other bodies in the manner described.

It is also well known that the falsity of this is too obvious to require the proofs he has mentioned. Its falsity is established by conclusive proofs, since it entails combining two contradictories: each would necessarily be both necessary in itself and not necessary in itself, originated and not originated, contingent and not contingent, eternal and not eternal, since two things alike must share these attributes.

If the view he rejects is one that no one has held and no one has disputed with him about, and he does not disagree with the proponent of the view with which he claims to agree in meaning, then the actual point of dispute remains unmentioned, and he has offered no proof to refute it. It is the view of someone who says:

“He is