the dispute is merely verbal. For the opponent says:

“He is not like every other body with respect to what is necessary, possible, or impossible for it. Rather, He and others share in what is denoted by corporeality, just as, when it is said that He is living and another is living, they share in what is denoted by ‘living.’ Likewise, He and others share in what is denoted by ‘knowing,’ ‘powerful,’ ‘existent,’ ‘existent,’ ‘essence,’ and ‘reality.’ Whatever necessarily follows from the shared aspect is established for both, whereas what is peculiar to one is not established for the other.”

It is evident that, if what is denoted by corporeality is said to entail that whatever is possible for one body must be possible for every other body, no rational person would say that Allah is a body in this sense.

Those who say, “He is a body,” maintain only that the shared aspect is comparable to what is shared in the meanings of ‘essence,’ ‘self-subsisting,’ and ‘spatial occupancy.’ At the same time, they say that this designation applies to things whose realities differ, as do ‘subject of attributes,’ ‘self-subsisting,’ and similar designations.

In short, if the likeness of bodies in everything necessary, possible, and impossible for them is established, that would make this argument unnecessary. If it is not established, this argument would be of no use to him. Thus, on either assumption, this argument is unnecessary.

The opponent therefore says that what is denoted by ‘body’ is comparable to what is denoted by ‘subject of attributes,’ ‘self-subsisting,’ ‘essence,’ and ‘quiddity.’ Existence is divided into that which is necessary in itself and that which is necessary through another. If one of these two kinds is necessary in itself, it does not follow that this must hold for every self-subsisting subject of attributes or every existent. Likewise, it does not hold for