by virtue of something other than Himself. The first possibility cannot be maintained; otherwise, every body would necessarily possess these attributes by virtue of its own essence, since they are equal in nature according to the stated assumption. If the second possibility holds, the Lord would depend on something that determines His particular attributes, and whatever needs another to confer its attributes upon it cannot be a deity.”

[Ibn Taymiyya’s commentary]

I say:

One might ask: “Why could His possession of these attributes not be necessary by virtue of His essence?”

His statement:

“Every body would necessarily possess these attributes, since they are equal in nature according to the stated assumption.”

The reply is:

What was assumed is that He is a body like other bodies. This entails sharing in what is denoted by corporeality. Why, then, do you say that this entails equality in nature? This rests on the claim that bodies are alike in nature—a claim that is disputed and false.

If it is said that this entails His being like every body in nature, such that whatever is possible for every body is possible for Him, whatever is impossible for it is impossible for Him, and whatever is necessary for it is necessary for Him, then no rational person who understands what he is saying would maintain this. Nor is it known to be the position of any recognized group. Its falsity is evident and requires no lengthy explanation. Yet its falsity does not entail that