Likewise, the philosophers who maintain that the rational soul is not a body base their principal argument on the claim that something indivisible inheres in it, and that what is indivisible can inhere only in what is indivisible. Thus, the various schools agree that if an attribute is indivisible, its locus is also indivisible.

[Sixth]

Regarding his statement:

“Either every part possesses these attributes.”

He may be answered as follows:

If you mean that each part possesses the attribute in the same way that the whole possesses it, no rational person would say this. For no body has an attribute belonging to its entirety that belongs to an indivisible atom within it in the same way that it belongs to the whole. But if you mean that the part possesses the attribute in a manner appropriate to that part, why do you claim that whatever possesses the attribute in this manner can exist separately from anything else, let alone be a god?

This is because none of the entities possessing attributes that are known to exist independently is an indivisible atom, nor is any observable entity possessing attributes an indivisible atom. Indeed, an indivisible atom—even assuming that it exists—cannot be perceived by the senses and does not exist separately. How, then, could something that cannot exist on its own unless others like it join it be alive, let alone be a horse or a camel? Still less could it be a human being, an angel, or a jinn—let alone a god!