they mean by unity in one is also found in the other, and whatever they mean by multiplicity in one is also found in the other.

[Fifth]

We do not concede that the alternatives they mention are exhaustive, even assuming that the body is divisible. Rather, it is possible to say:

Each part of these attributes inheres in a part of the entity possessing them, and each part of that entity possesses a part of the attribute.

This alternative differs from those he mentioned. It does not involve each part possessing the entire attribute, or only a portion of the whole possessing it in its entirety, or each part possessing an entire attribute peculiar to itself, or a single thing inhering in multiple things.

If he says, “The attribute is indivisible, while its locus is divisible,” the reply is:

This obstinately denies sense perception and reason. Rather, its divisibility corresponds to that of its locus. This is illustrated by one of the principal arguments advanced by those who affirm the indivisible atom. They say:

“Motion inheres in a body, and time is the measure of motion. Time contains the indivisible instant; hence the corresponding measure of motion is indivisible, and so the part that serves as its locus is indivisible.”

Thus, they inferred the existence of an indivisible part solely from the existence of an indivisible portion of motion. It is therefore clear that, in their view, the divisibility of the inhering attribute corresponds to that of its locus, though this is already known through sense perception and reason.