And if it is said that a single attribute inheres in the whole, this entails that a single thing inheres in multiple things.

Since this division into alternatives applies to something in which attributes are known to inhere, yet does not negate their inherence in it, it is clear that this argument is invalid.

[Fourth]

His statement: “The fourth is impossible, because it entails the inherence of a single thing in multiple things.”

The reply is:

We do not concede that this follows. For this account of inherence rests on the assumption that a single thing would then inhere in multiple things: he has posited that one knowledge, one power, and one life inhere in a collection of parts.

This premise is unsound. What is known about the unity and multiplicity of the inhering attribute corresponds to what is known about the unity and multiplicity of its locus. Thus, if the life inhering in a living body is said to be one life, the body is said to be one living thing. If the living thing is said to consist of multiple parts, its life is likewise said to consist of multiple parts. The inhering attribute and its locus are therefore alike with respect to unity and multiplicity.

Accordingly, their statement that a single thing inheres in multiple things is false. Rather, whatever