The reply is:

Likewise, the locus no longer remains a hand or an organ, nor does it remain capable, living, knowing, or sentient. For an isolated part, assuming it exists, is too insignificant to be called a hand, an organ, or a living, knowing, capable body. How, then, can it be called a god?

[Third]

Their argument is countered by the inherence of these attributes in a human being, for life, power, and sensation inhere in a human being. We have not mentioned knowledge, nor do we need to say, as the Mu‘tazilah did, that when accidents whose existence is conditioned on life inhere in a part of a whole, their effect extends to the entire whole.

Rather, we mention those accidents known to inhere in the outward body, such as life, sensation, movement, and power. The division into alternatives that they have proposed applies here too. For if it is said that every part of the human being possesses these attributes, it follows that there are multiple human beings. If only some parts possess all these attributes, there is no basis for privileging those parts, and it follows that the effect of an attribute does not extend beyond its locus.

Yet the assumption is that the entire outward body is living and sentient. If it is said that each part possesses a different attribute exclusively, this is necessarily known to be false; moreover, there is no basis for privileging one part over another.