it is said, “This is the first supposition, namely that every one of these parts possesses all these attributes,” the reply is:

That is not so. First, divisibility is denied. Second, only a portion of the attribute inhering in the whole inheres in each part; the entire attribute does not inhere in every part. Thus, the alleged necessary implication—that each part is a god—is invalid. For God, glorified be He, is the One who knows all things and has power over all things. But if a subject is supposed in which a portion of this power inheres, with neither it nor its locus being divisible, it does not follow that this part is capable, let alone that it is a lord. The inherence of a portion of power does not necessarily make its subject capable, nor does the inherence of a portion of life make its subject living, nor the inherence of a portion of knowledge make its subject knowing.

If it is said, “How can the division of power, life, and knowledge be conceived?”

The reply is:

Just as the division of the locus of these attributes can be conceived. A human being’s life inheres throughout his body. Likewise, sensation and power are among the attributes inhering in his body. Just as his body can be divided, so too can that which inheres in it.

If it is said, “When it is divided, it no longer remains power, knowledge, or life.”