And most rational people hold the contrary view. He has not established it here by proof, so simply rejecting the premise suffices. A fuller discussion belongs in its proper place.

Anyone who has examined this matter deeply knows that their claim that a body is composed of similar indivisible atoms that have come to be combined, or of matter and form, which are two substances, is among the most unsound statements.

If that is so, each attribute inhering in the entire locus may pervade the whole subject possessing it. This does not entail a single thing inhering in parts. Rather, what is said of the inhering attribute is the same as what is said of its locus, namely the subject possessing it.

[The second]

It may be said:

What is said of an attribute’s unity, multiplicity, divisibility and indivisibility is the same as what is said of the subject possessing it. This applies equally to attributes that presuppose life, such as power and sensation—indeed, life itself—and those that do not presuppose life, such as taste, colour and smell. The taste of an apple, for example, pervades the whole of it. If the apple is divided, its taste is divided too. One does not say that a single taste inheres in the apple as a whole.

Rather, if it is said, “The apple consists of many parts,” the reply is, “It has many tastes.” If it is said, “It is one thing,” the reply is, “One taste inheres in it.”

But if