possess these attributes, then either every part of Him possesses all the attributes; some of His parts possess them all; each part has an attribute peculiar to it; or each of these attributes, while remaining single, inheres in all the parts collectively.

The first possibility would entail a plurality of gods. The second is impossible, because there is no basis for giving some of those parts priority over the others in possessing these attributes. Moreover, it would entail that that part alone is God, to the exclusion of the others, since the effect of a cause does not extend beyond its locus. In the third case, likewise, there is no basis for giving any part priority. The fourth is impossible because it entails something single inhering in a multiplicity.

One may object to this on several grounds.

[A response to him on one ground]

The first

Your statement—“If He possessed each of these attributes, then either every part of Him possesses all these attributes,” and so forth—presupposes the existence of parts, which is not conceded. Why do you say that everything that is a body is composed of parts? This rests on the premise that bodies are composed of indivisible atoms, and that premise is not conceded.