Others say:

Rather, every existent must have one part distinguishable from another. No substance can therefore be conceived in which one part is not distinguishable from another. Yet when its parts become sufficiently small, they undergo a transformation and may no longer admit actual division; instead, dividing them transforms them. This is the case with portions of water: when they become sufficiently small, they turn into air. Although one part can be distinguished from another within them, they lack the capacity to withstand actual division and are instead transformed when such division is attempted.

On this view, we posit nothing in which one side cannot be distinguished from another; nor is anything infinite posited within what is infinite, nor any division without limit. Rather, every existent has one part distinguishable from another, and it may undergo a transformation before divisions without limit can occur.

This view thus removes the difficulties raised against the other views, while also corresponding to reality. The weakness of this argument is therefore clear.

[Continuation of al-Āmidī’s discussion: the second argument denying the corporeality of Allah Most High]

The second argument

Al-Āmidī said that it has been established that the Lord possesses knowledge, power and other attributes. If He were a body like other bodies, His possession of these attributes would entail an impossibility.

This follows in two ways:

The first:

If He were to