but some people may reserve the term for the indivisible atom, even though they and others invariably call a body a substance.

This is why al-Āmidī and others said, when denying that He is a substance:

“Either it admits division, in which case it is a composite body, or it does not admit division, in which case it is exceedingly small and insignificant.”

In their writings, the term “substance” frequently encompasses body, but it is also frequently restricted to the indivisible atom. What he initially stated concerns the denial of substance in the broader sense, which includes body. If his argument were sound, the denial of body would also be sound; however, its weakness has already been established.

If, on the other hand, what is denied is only the indivisible atom, he must assert that a body is composed of such atoms in order to deny that He is a body.

Yet this is a well-known point of dispute. Most people hold that a body is not composed of indivisible atoms, and this is the correct view, as has been explained at length elsewhere.

Some people say that it is composed of a finite number of substances that admit no division whatsoever, not even in the imagination. Others say that it is composed of an infinite number of such substances. Others say that it is composed of matter and form, but admits division without limit. Still others say that it is not composite, but can be divided into discrete, indivisible substances.