nor capable of sensation or voluntary movement, we cannot conceive of any self-subsisting substance distinct from him to which these attributes attach as accidents. Rather, affirming such a substance is a mere figment of the imagination with no reality. This imagined conception of sensible substances resembles the conception of those who affirm intelligible substances, except that the latter belongs to the intellect and the former to the imagination.

We can conceive of this shape without its being a rational animal. In that case, however, what is conceived is an abstract shape, an accident among other accidents. This is what is called a mathematical body, just as we conceive of numbers abstracted from the things counted. These abstract dimensions and numbers exist only in minds and in speech. Every existing body has dimensions peculiar to it. This is the corporeality and substantiality affirmed by those who maintain that substances are not alike, and it is analogous to form. The claim of the former that corporeal form is a substance and matter another substance thus parallels the claim of the latter that corporeal form consists of like substances. Yet there is nothing here but these self-subsisting individual entities and the attributes and dimensions inhering in them, which constitute their shapes and forms.

Furthermore, it is remarkable that these later speculative theologians, such as Abū Hāmid