on that question. If this were correct, knowing that bodies have come into being and are contingent would be among the easiest matters. Some are observed to come into being, and whatever comes into being is contingent. If they are all alike, whatever is possible for one is possible for another. It would therefore follow either that they have come into being or that it is possible for them to come into being. In either case, the intended conclusion is established.

One who denies that they are all alike does not advance the objection he cited: that they are alike in being substances but are differentiated and distinguished by factors that necessitate individuation, which in turn necessitates particularization. Rather, he maintains that they differ in their realities and their very beings, but resemble one another in subsisting in themselves, or in occupying space and admitting attributes. This is what it means for them to share the property of being substances, as he himself mentioned in his objection to the argument of those who hold that they are all alike.

He also says that, when things are alike in every respect, one cannot be singled out for something that distinguishes it from another without a determining factor. Otherwise, one of two like things would be preferred over the other without any grounds for preference. Allah’s will, exalted is He, gives preference to one of the two alternatives for a wise purpose that calls for this. That wise purpose is intended for its own sake; otherwise, the will stands in the same relation to both like alternatives. The wise purpose thus intended ultimately leads to a wise purpose intended for its own sake, as has been explained at length in its proper place.