is precisely the last alternative. The fact that the beginningless being resembles temporally originated things in one respect does not entail that it resembles them in being temporally originated. Rather, nothing prevents them from differing in beginninglessness and temporal origination while resembling one another in some other respect. Similarly, blackness and whiteness differ in one respect but not another. They cannot differ in every respect, for otherwise they would not share the properties of being accidents, being colours, and being temporally originated. Nor can they be identical in every respect, for otherwise blackness would be whiteness. Nevertheless, blackness resembling whiteness in one respect does not entail that it resembles it in the property of whiteness.”

If by this he means that, were He a substance, He would resemble other substances in what the term ‘substance’ denotes, this is like saying that, were He living, He would resemble other living beings in what being living denotes; or, were He knowing, He would resemble others who know in what being knowing denotes; or, were He powerful, He would resemble others possessing power in what being powerful denotes; or, were He existent, He would resemble other existing things in what being existent denotes. Sharing this with them does not entail resembling them in what is necessary, possible, or impossible for them, unless all substances are alike in these respects.

It is well known that someone who says He is a substance does not say that substances are all alike. Rather, he says that He differs from everything else. Indeed, most rational people say that