If you say, “This is clear, firmly rooted in innate nature, and known self-evidently,” you may be told: “This is no clearer than saying: The Maker of the world must either be where the world is or not be where the world is. The former means sharing its location and being inside it; the latter means being separate from it and outside it.”

If you say, “He may be neither inside it nor outside it,” you may be told: “Likewise, something that occupies space may neither move nor be at rest, just as you say of that which, according to you, exists in its own right yet neither moves nor is at rest.”

If you say, “I can conceive of this in something that does not occupy space, but not in something that does,” you may be told: “How, then, did you first conceive of the existence of something that does not occupy space, as you understand it? Your opponent says: ‘I can conceive only of something that is either inside or outside.’”

If you say, “This presupposes the capacity for those states, and only something that occupies space has that capacity. Whatever is not such a thing cannot be separate, share the same location, or be inside or outside,” he may say to you: “We can conceive of no existing being except one of this kind.”

If you say, “Rather, this is rationally possible, and its existence is also established,” he may say to you: “Likewise, something that occupies space but is incapable of motion and rest is also rationally possible, and its existence is established.”