in existence. If He does not occupy space, every substance must likewise be non-spatial, since they necessarily share the same nature; yet this is impossible. Moreover, “substance” means nothing other than that which occupies space in its own right, so whatever does not do so is not a substance.

[Ibn Taymiyya’s commentary]

I say:

One may object: We do not concede that being capable of being pointed to entails occupying space.

As for his statement, “Spatial occupancy means nothing other than this”: if he means that the concept of being pointed to is identical to the concept of occupying space, his statement is self-evidently false.

If, however, he means that whatever one description applies to, the other also applies to, he may be told: Some people dispute this with you and say that He—glory be to Him—is above the world and can be pointed to, yet does not occupy space.

If he says, “This is self-evidently false,” he may be told: This is no more implausible than your assertion that He exists in His own right, possesses attributes, and is visible to the eyes, yet cannot be pointed to and is neither inside the world nor outside it, neither separate from it nor interpenetrating it.

If you say, “Judging this impossible is a judgment of the imagination,” you may be told: Judging it impossible for a being to exist in its own right and be pointed to without occupying space is also a judgment of the imagination.

Indeed, rational minds’ assent to the existence of a being that can be pointed to yet does not occupy space