and that whatever is not like this can only be an inhering accident, and that no existent can be conceived except something that can be pointed to or something that subsists in what can be pointed to, as has been explained at length in its proper place. The refutation of his argument will be discussed below.

[The third argument]

He said: “By His very nature, He either admits of the inherence of successive accidents or does not. In the former case, He must be a locus for temporal occurrences, which is impossible, as will be explained. In the latter case, this must be impossible for all substances, since they necessarily share the same nature. But this is impossible, for it contradicts sensory experience.”

[Responses to him from several angles]

One may reply that there are several responses.

First, we do not concede the inherence of successive accidents. In this argument, which you have presented as exposing the inconsistency of those who hold this view, you have relied on denying that He is a body or a substance. If you then used this as evidence for that denial, you would be begging the question, since in each of the two issues you rely on the other. If, however, you rely on the other arguments to establish that denial, the unsoundness of your reasoning and that of others has already been demonstrated.